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Abstract
During the last few years the application of EC antitrust law has been
subject to a number of changes, aiming at giving a greater role to economic
analysis. This is leading to the abandonment of the traditional ordoliberal
inspiration of EC competition law. This paper explores how justied is this
change. In particular it argues that economic analysis provides dierent
views of how competition works and thet it may aect the application of
antitrust at dierent stages. From this point of view a more economic ap-
proach is not necessarily incompatible with a reformed ordoliberal paradigm.
What appears incompatible is an approach which substitutes eciency for
competition. Such an approach has gained a role in the US antitrust, but its
extension to the EC legal context is bound to produce a number of problems,
and to lead to results dierent from the desired ones.
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1 Introduction
During the last decades the criteria governing the application of EC Antitrust
Law have been subjected to substantial changes. These changes re
ect de-
velopments in the views about the role of competition law in the economic
and legal system, which have taken place in the US and Europe, as a result
of a wide ranging intellectual debate. The objective of this paper is to illus-
trate the developments in the application of EC antitrust law in light of this
debate.
The changes in EC Antitrust have concerned a number of aspects: pro-
cedure, through the enactment of Regulation 1/2003, the \Modernization
Regulation"; and substance, through a wider recourse to economic analysis.
As a result of this process, the same basic aims of competition law have
been questioned. While in the past EC competition law was seen as squarely
directed to the protection of the competitive process, there is now growing
consensus that the protection of competition is an instrument in order to
achieve consumer welfare and economic eciency. Lately, in the context
of reform of the EU Treaties undertaken by the Lisbon Intergovernamental
Conference, the same role of competition law in the EU legal system seems
to have been put in question.
At the outset it is appropriate to specify that we limit our analysis to EC
antitrust law, i.e. the provisions of the Treaty concerning restrictive practices
carried out by private undertakings, namely Article 81, (concerning restric-
tive agreements) and Article 82, (concerning abuses of dominant position)
and related Community legislation. We do not discuss merger control, ex-
cept for some brief references. Most importantly, we do not discuss the wider
subject of competition policy, i.e., the set of instruments and actions aiming
at insuring the establishment of competitive markets in the economy. This
set includes competition law, but extends to all policy measures aiming at
fostering the degree of competition in the economy: state-aid control, pri-
vatization, liberalization of previously regulated sectors and pro-competitive
regulation of still subject to regulation sectors1. What distinguishes compe-
tition law from the other measures is that the former consists of rules gov-
erning the behaviour of rms in the market, which are applied in a general
1For an exposition of the achievements of the competition policy of the EC see
Anderson-Heimler (2007); see also Slot (2004).
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and non-discretionary way2.
This distinction is particularly relevant in the EC context, because of the
double role played by the Commission in the eld of competition. On the one
hand, the Commission is the executive branch of the Union, thus enjoying
powers of legislative initiative. Therefore it is a central actor in the shaping
of EC competition policies. On the other hand the Commission is in charge
of applying EC competition law, (under the review of the European Courts),
and plays an extremely important role in this respect, through its decisional
practice and the enactment of interpretative principles under the form of
Guidelines. While in its rst role the Commission is in fact a policy agent, in
the second one it should just be guided by the criteria set by legislation and
by the European Courts of Justice through which competition law should be
interpreted3.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section I we summarize how eco-
nomic views of competition have evolved over time. We note that dierent
views of competition imply a dierent role for antitrust law, which in turn
aects the criteria according to which the law is applied. In Section II we
review the developments in the application of EC competition law in the
past decades. First, we examine how a specic view of the role of competi-
tion in the legal order has in
uenced the shape and the application of EC
competition law; we then review the changes that over time have taken place
in such an application, aiming at introducing an economic and eect-based
approach. Finally, we analyze the new approach adopted by the Commis-
sion, based on the eects on consumer welfare and eciency, and discuss its
implications for the debate on the role of competition in the EU legal order
which has been opened by the Lisbon Intergovermental Conference.
1.1 Changing views on competition
Since the appearance of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations, the seminal work by economist and philosopher Adam Smith,
competitive markets are seen as a desirable framework for fostering welfare
2The tendency to confuse competition law with competition policy has been noted by
Grillo (2006).
3In fact this two-headed role of the Commission has been at times criticized, as antitrust
decisions risked being in
uenced by considerations of policy. Therefore it was sometimes
suggested that decisions in antitrust cases were attributed to an independent European
Competition Authority.
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and growth. According to Smith, it is not from the benevolence of the grocer
that we can expect the satisfaction of our needs, but from his greed. Greed
will induce him to nd and provide the goods we need. And competition
among greedy grocers would insure that there are plenty of goods supplied at
the best prices. From Adam Smith onwards, it has been generally maintained
that competition leads to desirable results in terms of productive eciency,
low prices, incentives to innovation and discovery of new areas for market
activity. Therefore a market system where economic agents compete among
one another guided by a certain degree of rivalry leads to ecient production
and allocation of resources to the benet of the consumers.
Adam Smith also argued that public policies should be directed to guar-
antee that markets work eectively, to the benet of the general public (this
was in fact the subject of his most famous book). While he thought that
most restraints to the functioning of a free market came from public policies,
he also warned that restraints to trade could well come from private actions.
He noted that seldom people from the same trade gather without conspir-
ing for practicing higher prices or for monopolizing the markets. Modern
antitrust law in a sense derives from this remark, and it is interpreted as a
public intervention aimed at protecting the \social mechanism" that allows
the market to be conformed by competition guided by rivalry. The way this
is done is to impose rules that prevent conducts, which unduly restrict or
eliminate competition.
1.2 The character of competition law
Antitrust rules concern agreements and unilateral practices by rms with
a substantial market power which restrict competition. In the European
Community, Article 81 of the EC Treaty forbids agreements which restrict
competition and Article 82 forbids abuses of a dominant position. Similar
provisions exist in the US, where Section 1 of the Sherman Act, (the world
rst modern antitrust law, enacted in 1890), prohibits conspiracies among
rms to restrict competition and Section 2 prohibits monopolization, and in
most other countries4.
Competition rules have a peculiar character. First, antitrust law is based
4The diusion of antitrust laws has accelerated since the late 1990s, with the aban-
donment of the command economy in the former socialist countries. Now more than 120
countries have an antitrust law.
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on the idea that the desirable results of competition will be obtained spon-
taneously on the market, once the conditions for its competitive working are
guaranteed5. Because antitrust law is directed at protecting a competitive
mechanism based on rivalry, it is directed at removing the obstacles to the
competitive working of the market deriving from private behaviour, but it
should not aim at attaining a particular result. Secondly, competition rules
concern a subject, which has profound social and political implications: the
functioning of the market, the institution, which allows voluntary exchange
among equals pursuant to the law. As the early economists pointed out, the
proper functioning of the competitive market is based on some of the basic
tenets of a liberal society, such as freedom of contracting and property right,
and on rules and institutions which guarantee that the process of exchange
takes place undistorted by coercion arising from the use of market power, so
as to give rise to a selection mechanism based on merit6. These rules may be
determined either endogenously by the trading subjects, or exogenously by
laws based on the recognized \social value" of the market. As a leading law
and economic scholar notes \a market is not competitive by assumption or
by construction, a market becomes competitive, and competitive rules come
to be established, institutions emerge to place limits on individual behaviour
patterns"7.
As antitrust rules are related to the basic tenets of a liberal economic
society, it is not surprising that competition law has represented the legal
framework of reference for the economic system of a free society. In the
US, the Sherman Act has long assumed a nearly constitutional character,
as the basic charter of the freedom of initiative8. In Europe, as we will see,
competition rules were born from a vision which gave them a central role in
the legal order of a free economic society9.
However, this central role has contributed to charge antitrust rules of
other objectives which are generally related to the correct functioning of a
market system: in particular, freedom of individual and business initiative,
5This characteristic distinguish antitrust from economic regulation, for instance
through the xing of prices or other conditions of supply.
6For a discussion see Amato (1997); Grillo (2006).
7Buchanan (1964).
8Peritz (1996) provides a comprehensive discussion of the role of antitrust law in the
U.S. See also Hovenkamp (2005).
9Gerber (1998) discusses the role that the ordoliberal vision had the shaping of EC
competition law. On this see below. See also Amato (1997).
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broadening of economic opportunities, a certain dispersion of wealth, freedom
of choice by the consumers10. While, in general, protection of competition
would also lead to the attainment of these objectives, at times the weighing
of some of them in the context of competition policy appears to have led
to an application of antitrust law guided by the criteria of \fairness" or by
distributional considerations, therefore subject to the political climate of the
day11.
In particular, in the early years, recourse to antitrust law has often been
seen as a more desirable alternative in comparison with more direct forms of
intervention in the market, like administrative price controls or governmental
control over the industry, in connection with the rising of economic tensions
which hampered the condence of the market system: for instance, when
in
ationary pressures appeared to reduce consumers' buying power; or when
industry consolidation processes threatened the survival of certain types of
enterprises12. This obviously aected the way in which the law was applied.
However, as Baker13 notes, at a certain point competition law seems to have
represented a political bargain between both producers, who are guaranteed
protection from more direct forms of intervention, and consumers, who are
guaranteed that a certain level of competition will prevail in the market. Such
a political bargain would help explaining the bipartisan role that antitrust law
has assumed after World War Two and the systematic recourse to objective
criteria based on economic analysis.
1.3 Competition law and economic analysis
Another peculiar character of antitrust laws is that they directly concern
an economic concept: competition in the market. Therefore, more than
any other kind of rules, they raise the issue of the relations between legal
principles and economics.
10See Fox (2003); Pitofsky (2003). Peritz (1996) describes the cycles in the application
of US antitrust law in its rst century of application.
11Peritz (1996) describes the cycles in the application of US antitrust law in its rst
century of application.
12For the U.S. see Peritz (1996); Gerber (1998) gives an illustration of the debate on
competition and direct intervention in Europe at the turn of the XIX century. For Europe
see also Pace (2005).
13
J. Baker (2006).
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Economics contributes to the interpretation of the law at dierent levels:
rst it provides a framework of analysis of competition and of its essential
features; secondly it plays an important role in the development of rules of
decision from which it is possible to evaluate whether the conducts under
examination must be considered illegal.
a) Dierent views of competition
While on the basis of the early analysis of Smith we may dene a com-
petitive market as one where rms compete for demand guided by rivalry,
economists have not always been in agreement about the conditions necessary
for a competitive market system to be established and fully working; this be-
cause the analysis of competition may be made from dierent points of view.
In his famous exposition Smith singled out the three elements which have
since characterized the analyses of competition: incentives for the economic
agents to appropriate the benets from the gain from trade; a competition
for demand guided by rivalry; and the ecient end-result arising from the
process, represented by the supply of plenty of goods at the lowest possible
cost. Subsequent economic analysis has drawn attention on one or another
of these aspects.
In particular, the marginalist economists of the late XIX century focused
their analysis on the conditions under which a system of exchange could
lead to the desirable results in term of productive and allocative eciency14.
They elaborated the model of perfect competition, where individual agents
responded passively to incentives given by prices, which in turn were deter-
mined by equilibrium between total demand and supply. Such a system leads
to the desired conditions of minimizing costs (productive eciency) and to
prices equal to marginal cost (allocative eciency): therefore the benets for
the consumer are maximized. This happens on condition that rms do not
have any market power so that prots are zero in the long run, because com-
petition to get any extra prot leads to the adoption by all rms of the most
ecient techniques. Since agents are price takers and not price makers, each
of them is very small with respect to the size of the market. This model had
a fundamental role as a reference point in the analysis of markets throughout
the XX century.
Another stream of thought argues that the model of perfect competition
14The most sophisticated illustration of the early marginalist approach is the El ements
d'Economie Politique Pure, the 1874 work by the French economist L eon Walras, the
founder of the general equilibrium analysis.
8A. Pera / WP n.13 DiSSE, University of Macerata
is a static model, and it does not catch the dynamic features exemplied by
Smith, that is the search of the prot opportunities by grocers and their like.
The economists supporting such an approach have centred their analysis on
the role of the grocer, i.e. the entrepreneur, in identifying new opportunities
of appropriating benets from trade, and on the role of incentives in inducing
him to action15. This implies striving for introducing innovations in the
characteristics of the market or in technology, and for identifying new needs
and new markets.
This view is also associated with a specic vision of the role of the market,
which is perceived not only as the place where exchange takes place, but also
as the institution which allows the gathering and exchanging of widespread
information, and in which the agents' actions are guided by the discovery and
expectation of new opportunities. Competition is then seen as a discovery
process16.
The suggestions concerning the obstacles to competition deriving from
the two approaches we have surveyed are rather dierent. Obviously, what-
ever scheme we take, cartels among competitors to restrict prices or control
market shares are undesirable: they raise prices above marginal costs and
reduce the incentives to search for new prot opportunities. However, the
two approaches lead to dierent conclusions concerning a number of other
situations, which are relevant for antitrust. Traditional analysis concentrates
on the lack of market power of independent economic agents, which requires
them to take prices as given. Therefore, any arrangements, which reduce
the autonomy of the agents, like any form of agreement between rms which
operate on the same market (horizontal restraint) or at dierent stages of
the productive and distribution system (vertical restraint), may aect the
eciency results of competition. In the same vein, any form of market power
is considered undesirable, because it implies departure from allocative e-
ciency. Therefore the traditional analysis would suggest intervention when
there are important deviations from the paradigm of perfect competition.
From this point of view, since the 1930s a stream of economic thought has
15This view is generally attributed to Schumpeter (1948) and to the Austrian economists.
However, it may be found in Chicago economist F. Knight and in the works of Nobel
laureate J. Buchanan, the leading Public Choice scholar. A recent re-elaboration in modern
terms, compatible with general equilibrium analysis, is in Makovsky-Ostroy (2001), who
also give a comprehensive view of the various approaches to competition.
16This is one of the seminal contributions of F. Hayek (1948).
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argued that a state akin to perfect competition is unlikely to prevail in the
market, because information asymmetry and promises to entry allow rms
to have a certain degree of market power17. Obviously this suggests a more
widespread intervention in the markets.
The alternative approach looks at the market economy as an institution
which is built by the same agents in the market, as they endeavour to dis-
cover opportunities to trade so to benet from them. Freedom of contract
in a market context allows agents to fashion their relations in the way which
is most appropriate to reach this result: therefore contractual arrangements
reducing the autonomy of the parties may still aim at making exchange more
ecient. The existence of prots and (apparent) market power is not nec-
essarily proof of the absence or restriction of competition: they may as well
indicate that the rm is innovating quickly and has an advantage over its
competitors. Exploitation of the consumers by dominant rms through mar-
ket power could represent powerful incentives for other rms to enter the
market. Furthermore, dominant enterprises have usually achieved this posi-
tion through a superior performance in the market, and it would be against
the very meaning of competition to punish a company for its success.
From the point of view of this approach, there is some ambiguity in
antitrust rules, because their intervention to limit the abuse of market power
inevitably leads to limits to freedom of contract and the use of property
rights, the same elements on which the institution of the market is based18.
Therefore, antitrust rules should be applied parsimoniously, and the limits
set by competition law to these basic rights should be only those strictly
necessary to eliminate anticompetitive restrictions. Then antitrust should
be basically a marginal kind of intervention, which is relatively rare, and
generally concerns large distortions of competition.19
b) Decision rules and economic analysis
A second way in which economic analysis has a particular role in the
application of antitrust law concerns its role in devising decisional rules.
In particular, Courts and Administrative Authorities applying antitrust law
have early developed a decisional practice whereby certain practices, which
17The seminal works on imperfect competition are the ones of Chamberlin (1933), who
opened the Harvard tradition in industrial economics, and J. Robinson (1933).
18This is the \paradox" on which R.Bork built his criticism of US antitrust practice.
See Bork (1978).
19This is the suggestion of Hovenkamp (2005).
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are presumed to restrict competition, are prohibited per se. In such a case,
once it is proven that a certain practice is actually in place, the rms involved
in it are considered to be infringing the law, without any need to ascertain
whether the practice actually had competitive eects. Other practices, in-
stead, cannot be presumed to be immediately restrictive, and a nding of
illegality may derive only from an evaluation of their eects on competition,
through the application of the rule of reason. This implies evaluating the
restrictive characteristics of the practice and balancing them out with its
pro-competitive eects.
Whether a practice is considered prohibited per se or should be evaluated
under the \rule of reason" is a question of presumptions: if a practice is
forbidden per se, it means that its analysis under a legal and economic point
of view has shown that in the generality of cases it restricts competition
(typically this is the case of cartels xing prices or sharing markets).20 When
a practice is not seen as immediately anticompetitive, economic analysis can
help.
In this context, economic analysis helps the decisional process also by
dening whether we should start from a presumption of legality or illegality,
which in turn depends on whether we should expect that it has or does not
have anticompetitive eects, and by dening the criteria on the basis of which
we may evaluate whether it is restrictive21. This obviously depends on the
paradigm of analysis of competition that is followed. The paradigm based on
perfect competition would tend to consider structural aspects of the market
in order to evaluate whether it deviates from its desirable outcome. The
paradigm based on incentives would rather look at the actual or presumed
eects that the practice would end up having on the market.
The relevance of presumptions in the decisional process suggests that
there is a risk that decisions may be wrong. From this point of view two
kinds of errors are possible: 1) practices, which restrict competition, may be
considered harmless; or 2) practices, which are harmless, may be considered
restrictive22. While legal and economic analysis have at length discussed the
relative undesirability of the approaches leading to one or the other of the two
20For the interpretation of the per se rule from the point of view of presumptions, see
Kovacic (2003); Wood (2004).
21For a discussion of the role of economic presumption in the application of the rule of
reason see Albhorn-Padilla (2007).
22For a discussion of decision rules in relation to the risk of errors see Evans-Padilla
(2005).
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kinds of errors, which one ends up prevailing depends on the criteria on the
basis of which we evaluate whether competition has been restricted. This in
turn depends on the way in which we think competition works in the market,
i.e. on economic analysis. From our previous discussion, it appears that the
traditional paradigm would suggest the adoption of criteria for evaluation,
which prevent \type 1" errors, while the paradigm based on incentives would
rather suggest that the criteria of intervention be aimed at preventing \type
2" errors.
c) Structuralism and the US experience
Given the dierent approaches to competition, it is not surprising that
economic analysis of how a competitive market system works has been evolv-
ing over time. And the interpretation of the law has been evolving with it.
At dierent times, a dierent degree of attention has been given to dier-
ent determinants of competitive behaviour. Therefore the criteria according
to which to evaluate how dierent practices may harm competition have
changed over time. To show this it is useful to examine the US experience23.
Until the 1970's the application of the antitrust law in the United States
was guided by the structuralise analysis of the market which dominated in-
dustrial organization analysis in the `50s and `60s. Inspired by the traditional
scheme of perfect competition, structuralists argued that attitude towards ri-
valry, and therefore competition, depended on the number of rms on the
market, which in turn depended on exogenous factors like barriers to entry
and economies of scale24.
Since at the basis of the traditional scheme was price taking and lack
of market power, structuralist analysis tended to consider harmful to com-
23A summary in US experience is in Kovacic and Shapiro (2000). A comparison with
the EC experience is in Pera-Auricchio (2005). Despite European antitrust has a specic
tradition, rooted in economic debates and legislative experiments dating back to the end
of XIX century, as discussed by Gerber (1998), the experience in the interpretation of an-
titrust law in Europe shares much with the one in the US, where a systematic application
of modern antitrust law started more than sixty years earlier. This not surprising. Legal
thinking in antitrust has been in
uenced by economic analysis, and in this eld there have
always been close contacts between the two sides of the Atlantic. Furthermore, since the
early development of EC competition law there have been continuous discussions on an-
titrust foundations and methods between European and American lawyers and economists,
which have lead to common ways of understanding the core issues and a common general
approach.
24Earlier developers of structuralist analysis were E. Mason, with his studies in admin-
istered prices, and Bain (1956), who rst introduced the concept of barriers to entry.
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petition arrangements which could reduce the autonomy of the rm in the
market. Furthermore, in
uenced by the imperfect competition theories of
the previous decades, they were sceptical about the automatic establishment
of competition in the market. As a result, decision rules were focused not
on actual or potential eects of practices on competition, but on their char-
acteristics: as long as they led to a reduction in the autonomy of the agents
there was a risk that competition was restricted.
Horizontal agreements were considered per se illegal independently on
whether they were collusive or just of cooperative nature, aiming at allow-
ing a better and more ecient use of resources25. Fears that limits to the
autonomy of the rms led to the prohibition per se also of vertical agree-
ments between rms at dierent levels of the production and distribution.
Therefore, the law was interpreted to protect not only inter-brand competi-
tion, i.e. competition among producers trying to place their products on the
market through the distribution channels, but also intra-brand competition
among distributors of the same products. Retail price maintenance (i.e. the
xing of retail prices by the producers) had been considered a violation per
se already at the beginning of the century; the same happened for exclusive
dealings, which prevented commercialization of competing products through
the same distribution channels, and territorial restrictions which prevented
competition among outlets26.
The primary fear with mergers was that they could reduce the number
of competitors on the market, irrespective of whether this led to an eective
reduction in competition27.
From the point of view of unilateral behaviour, concerning companies
in dominant position, US judges decided early on that the law would not
apply to exploitative behaviour. Indeed, the law protected the competitive
process, therefore a monopolist that had achieved its position by superior
performance should be free to practice the conditions he thought appropri-
ate28. However, the possession of market power was seen as a limiting factor:
legal rules tended to be based on the concept of \competition on the merits",
meaning that the dominant rm should only compete on the basis of \supe-
25See U.S. vs. Topco Associates., 405 US 596 (1972).
26See U.S. vs. Arnold Schwinn and Co., 388 US 365 (1967)
27See Brown Shoe Co. vs. U.S. 370 US 294 (1962).
28See Blumenthal (2007).
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rior performance and acumen"29. Therefore, dominant companies could not
use practices depending on their market power in order to restrain compe-
tition, for instance through loyalty-enhancing practices. Competitive harm
was usually dened on the basis of the obstacles posed to competitors to
compete eectively with the dominant rm. In fact this criterion was often
applied with little attention to the actual eects of the conduct on the market,
so that practices would be considered restrictive as long as they excluded a
competitor and generally dominant rms behaviour was not justied if they
could get advantages on the market from economies associated with their
size30
Finally, because the analysis suggested that restrains to competition were
pervasive, and great relevance was given to the number of companies in the
market, there was a very activist tilt in the enforcement activity, particularly
in oligopolistic markets31.
This approach was widely criticized, since it led to decisions, which tended
to consider restrictive practices, which did not harm competition (\false pos-
itives") and could often lead to eciency and improvements in consumer
welfare. Therefore they ended up protecting existing (inecient) competi-
tors. From this approach a perception arose that antitrust law was guided
more by criteria of \fairness" and the aim to protect small enterprises rather
than by the objective of protecting a vigorous free and competitive market32.
c) The Chicago school
However, since the 1970s reliance of competition law on economic struc-
turalism has been superseded by the evolution in economic thought, which
has stressed the role of incentives and eciencies in determining agent's be-
haviour in the market. In particular, what has come to be known as the
Chicago School has shown that a number of practices, which according to
the structuralist paradigm were considered to be restrictive of competition
because they limited the autonomy of economic agents in the market, aimed
instead to give rise to more ecient methods of production or commercializa-
tion, which in fact allowed the rms to compete more eciently. In particular,
29This principle was established in US vs. Grinnell Co. 384 US 563 (1966).
30This seems the conclusion to be drawn from U.S. vs. Aluminum Corporation of Amer-
ica (Alcoa) 948F21 (1945).
31In the early 1970s the DOJ tried to argue that oligopolistic interdependence among he
few producers of cereals in a very concentrated market represented an agreement restricting
competition.
32This nding was also at the basis of the pervasive criticism developed by Bork (1978).
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vertical restraints, i.e. agreements between producers and distributors, could
be very well guided by the need to guarantee that the agents appropriate the
benets deriving from specic investments they bear. On this regard, for
instance, it is clear that a distributor who is guaranteed an exclusive deal-
ing will devote more eorts and investments to penetrate the market33. Also,
horizontal cooperation among enterprises not aimed at xing prices or subdi-
vide markets is often pursued in order to overcome problems of externalities,
without restricting competition on the market.
It may be appropriate to see the changes brought forward by the Chicago
school in the context of the second of the general streams of thought about
the scope and role of competition we have examined earlier. In particular,
the Chicago approach should be viewed in the context of a framework of
analysis inspired by the seminal works of Coase34 and Williamson35, which
views interactions of agents through cooperation as an alternative to the
exchange to overcome the obstacles to the achievement of eciency.
In fact the innovation in the analysis of economic practices corresponds
to a change in the view about the way in which competition works: rms
structure their productive and commercial arrangements in order to reap
the benets from trade and for competing more eciently. Prot incentives
become a powerful drive for the changes. And the practices cannot be con-
sidered restrictive of competition because they are directed at widening the
markets and making rms more eective competitors.
This approach suggested profound changes in the legal rules governing
application of antitrust law. First, with the exception of a few practices
which had a clear anti-competitive aim, like hard-core cartels to x prices and
subdivide markets, which should be presumed illegal per se, most practices
should be examined on the basis of their eect on competition through an
analysis base on the \rule of reason". It was also argued that certain practices
are generally harmless, in so far as they do not restrict competition and are
usually benecial to economic activity, and therefore may be presumed to be
per se legal, and not worth further investigation36.
This paradigm leads to a substantial change in the way in which to evalu-
ate the harm to competition from a certain practice. Because of the presump-
33See Telser (1960).
34Coase (1937); Coase (1960).
35Williamson (1975).
36This is the position taken by Poster on vertical restraints. See Posner (1981).
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tion that many market practices were aimed at solving appropriation issues
and at achieving eciency, the legal criterion on the basis of which practices
would be evaluated should be based on their eect on the nal market. In
particular, starting with the seminal contribution of Posner37, the Chicago
approach argued that the anti-competitiveness of a practice should be evalu-
ated on the basis of its eects on prices and quantities and from the ensuing
eect on consumer welfare.
This approach has particular implications for the analysis of practices of
dominant companies. As we have seen, the structuralist approach analyzed
the behaviour of dominant companies performance with nearly exclusive at-
tention to the eects on the structure of the market and the eect on compe-
tition. The new approach then suggests that exclusion of competitors should
be considered anticompetitive only when it leads to decrease in consumer
welfare.
The Chicago analysis has been very successful both from the point of
view of methodology and of its impact on the decisional process.
From the rst point of view, antitrust analysis is now generally based on
the consideration of eciency and on the eects of practices on the market.
Therefore, there is generally agreement that the number of practices forbid-
den per se should be limited to hard-core restrictions, while the others should
be either considered per se legal or analyzed on the basis of the \rule or rea-
son"38. In this context, during the last twenty years various schemes of eco-
nomic analysis have been implemented, leading to less optimistic conclusions
concerning the need for an activist antitrust intervention. These schemes are
generally classied as Post-Chicago analysis. While Chicago analysis tends
to restrict intervention to hard-core practices like cartels, this more recent
economic analysis has introduced new elements into the paradigm, in partic-
ular considering the possibility that rms may strategically use information
advantages. This would be particularly relevant for the analysis of dominant
companies, which could use strategically vertical agreements in order to ex-
clude competitors from the market. Therefore, this line of thought tends to
refuse the relevance of per se legality and suggests a wider recourse to the
37Posner (1975).
38In fact, one can say that there is now very little dierence between the Chicago
approach and the one of other schools of thought, like Harvard. On this see Kovacic
(2005). See also Elhauge (2007).
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\rule of reason"39.
From the second point of view the Chicago approach has had a decisive
impact on the decisional practice of Courts and Competition Authorities. In
the U.S. in particular over time most decisions inspired by the structuralist
approach of the 1960s and 1970s were reversed. The eect of practices on
the consumer has become the standard paradigm for evaluating consumer
harm and non hard-core practices are now reviewed under the rule of reason
approach based on consumer welfare analysis.40 In 2007 the Leegin decision,
reversing a decisional practice nearly a century old, abandoned the per se
prohibition of retail price maintenance41.
From a more general point of view, the US decisional practice appears to
have moved towards the adoption of the vision of incentive-based competi-
tion. In particular, in some recent decisions the Courts seems to suggest that
the constraints to the behaviour of dominant enterprises should be evaluated
very carefully and in a limited number of circumstances42. In particular, in
Trinko the Court argued against the imposition of a duty to deal in the case
of rms controlling essential facilities, maintaining that limits on monopolists
to exploit their position would aect their ability to innovate43.
1.4 From the Competitive Process to Eciency
The Chicago contribution suggests the need for a more objective foundation
to the legal analysis of restrictive practices, providing criteria to this eect.
The consumer welfare approach may be considered as a way of better un-
derstanding when practices may be presumed to be actually directed only at
39For an illustration of the Post Chicago economic theories see Shapiro (1989). For a
discussion see Hoovenkamp (2001) and Makovsky-Ostroy (2001).
40Among the most relevant decisions are Sylvania, [Continental Inc. vs. GTE Sylvania
Inc. 433 US 36 (1977)] which applied \rule of reason" analysis to vertical restraints; BMI
[Broadcast Music Inc. vs. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 441 US1 (1979)] which
applied \rule of reason" analysis to horizontal cooperation; and Brooks [Broooks Group
ltd. vs. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, 509 US 209 (1993)] which revised the
standard for predatory pricing.
41See Leegin Creative Leather Products vs. PSKS in 06 US 480 (2007).
42As noted by Braun-Ginsborg (2007), during the last decade the Supreme Court has
generally been favourable to the defendant, therefore making it dicult for plaintis to
argue their case.
43See Verizon Communication Inc. vs. Law Oces of Courts v. Trinko, LLP. 02 US
582 (2004).
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restricting competition on the market (through exclusion or coercion), be-
cause they do not result in any increase in eciency and therefore in benets
for the consumer. The same approach proves useful also in assessing whether,
instead, such a presumption is not justied because there are other reasons to
undertake them rather than for anticompetitive purposes. In particular, if a
practice gives rise to a reduction in prices or an increase in output, it may be
inferred that there was a good reason, on eciency grounds, to undertake it,
and that there exists on the market sucient competition to cause the trans-
fer of at least part of the gains from eciency to the consumer and, therefore,
to ensure pressure towards allocative as well as productive eciency.
In this vein, other approaches have been elaborated with an aim to pro-
viding a more objective, economic-based evaluation of restrictions to com-
petition. In recent years a number of economic criteria have been proposed
in order to give a more objective content to the concept of \competition on
the merits", so as to take into account that, if the practice is the result of a
superior performance by the rm, it may lead to the exclusion of a competi-
tor, but also to an improvement of the conditions of supply and to a better
treatment of consumers44.
However, the contribution of Chicago to antitrust law goes further than
just stressing the importance of a more thorough economic analysis of compe-
tition practices. Instead it calls for a profound change in the whole approach
to the objectives of antitrust law, by putting at its centre a purely economic
paradigm. According to the analysis of legal theorists like Bork and Posner,
eciency and consumer welfare are not the criteria on the basis of which
to evaluate the conformity of the behaviour of the parties to the pursued
aim of competition law, i.e. the preservation of a competitive market; they
are the very same nal objectives of the law. The reason why law protects
44The eect of the exclusionary practice on consumer welfare is one criterion which may
help in evaluating whether the exclusion was actually anticompetitive. Other criteria have
been proposed in order to try and qualify the behaviour of the dominant company also on
the basis of the characteristics of the competitors. These criteria have been labelled as the
\prot sacrice", the \non economic sense" and the \as ecient competitor" tests. The
\prot sacrice test" examines whether the practice leads to a prot sacrice which has no
justication other than damaging the competitor; the \non economic sense" test argues
that a conduct is unlawful if it makes no economic sense other than the elimination of
the competitor; lastly, the \as ecient competitor test" considers as restrictive only those
practices which could lead to the exclusion of competitors as ecient as the dominant
rm. See the contributions in OECD (2005). For a critical discussion see Vickers (2005).
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competition is because it is the best way to achieve consumer welfare and
eciency. It follows that competition is not the nal objective of the law,
but an intermediate one: it is, in fact, an instrument for the achievement of
eciency and for welfare improvement45.
This conclusion is not obvious, however. As we have discussed, the
Chicago approach is based on a paradigm of competition which gives great
relevance to incentives and to their role in a process guided by rivalry. At-
tention to consumer welfare and eciency derives from the preoccupation
that antitrust enforcement may lead to type 2 errors, and this justies that
a dominant role in the analysis of practices is given to economic criteria.
However, this does not imply a shift in the role of competition from being
the main objective of the law to a mere instrument.
Nevertheless, the Chicago-eciency approach has gained wide support
among economic and legal experts in the US and in Europe46. In fact, it seems
to put on more objective grounds the analyses of anticompetitive practices
and to eliminate the risk that in the evaluation consideration is given to
issues relating to the fairness of the competitive process, or to its social
implications.
However, this implies a radical change in perspective. Traditional compe-
tition law aimed at, and was based on, the analysis of the interaction among
competitors, in order to insure that it was not distorted by the abuse of mar-
ket power. Eciency and consumer welfare considerations were helpful in
this context, because they provided criteria on the basis of which to evaluate
the eects, actual or potential, of the practices at hand. In the new context,
the interaction among competitors is no longer important, so long as it leads
to improvements in eciency and consumer welfare.
As a matter of fact, a suggestion stems from the eciency framework, to
examine practices not in terms of their eects on consumer welfare but rather
45See Bork (1978); Posner (1974). R. Bork, one of the earliest critics of decisions based
on the structuralist paradigm, argued that the US Sherman Act had been drafted under
the explicit and ole purpose of maximizing eciency to the benet of the consumers.
Therefore, in his view, it was the legislative will which required that courts apply and
eciently orient criteria in the application of the antitrust law. However Bork's analysis of
the origin of the law was highly controversial and is not generally shared [see Hoovenkamp
(2005); Peritz (1996)].
46Among the European contributions supporting an eciency approach to the applica-
tion of competition law, see Jenny (1993); Ahlborn-Padilla (2007); Heimler (2007). See
also OECD (2005).
19A. Pera / WP n.13 DiSSE, University of Macerata
in terms of their eects on total welfare and wealth. According to this view,
if a practice leads to savings in the use of resources which are larger than the
loss of benets to the consumers, the same should be considered harmless
because in any case a transfer of wealth from producers to consumers would
lead to a potential increase in consumers' welfare as well, according to the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion47.
This latter conclusion emphasizes the dierence between the Chicago-
eciency paradigm and the traditional one, once a meaningful economic
analysis is included in it. For the rst paradigm, substantial restriction of
competitive pressure or even its elimination are of no signicance, as long as
the practice gives rise to eciency gains. This in turn is a consequence of a
more general dierence: traditional analysis is concerned not only with total
welfare maximization, but also with the allocative eects of the competitive
process. And, as we noted earlier, recalling the view of competition law as a
political bargain, the broad political support for antitrust law derives from
the perception that the allocative eects of competition also represent a fair
criterion for the distribution of wealth between producers and consumers.
The eciency approach reckons that these allocative eects should not con-
cern the application of competition law.
It is important to note that this conclusion of the eciency approach
derives from a more general view of the relations between legal principles
and economic analysis, which nds roots in the positive approach to law
developed by Posner, according to which the development of common law
and of its criteria of application are guided by the search of ecient solutions
to the problems posed to the judges48. Therefore, he argues that judges'
decisions should be guided by the paradigm of economics, which provides
the best indications for achieving eciency. In our case, this would imply
that the application of antitrust law should be based exclusively on welfare
maximization.
However, Posner's approach to law and economics is very controversial49.
His views are obviously incompatible with those conceptions of the law which
view legislation as the consequence of the preference of society for certain
47Both Bork (1978) and Posner (1972) argue for such a total welfare approach. In 1975
Posner proposed a consumer welfare approach, considering that the quest for monopoly
would produce monpolization costs which would exhaust any producer surplus: therefore
changes in consumer welfare would correspond to changes in total welfare.
48Posner (1972).
49For a survey see Parisi (2005).
20A. Pera / WP n.13 DiSSE, University of Macerata
interests, which are therefore protected, and therefore see competition law
not only from an economic point of view50. In fact these analyses appear to
be very important in inspiring application of antitrust legislation in many
countries51.
Criticism has also come from approaches to law and economics which,
like the Public Choice school, are sympathetic to a legal analysis based on
economic paradigm, and still believe that economic considerations matter not
so much in determining the way in which the law is applied in the specic
case, but rather in determining the institutional context in which transactions
take place, including in particular the system of law. In this context the role
of legal rules is to dene socially stable reference rules to the use of economic
rights52. It is very doubtful that a rule based on case-by-case decisions on
the grounds of an eciency criterion would provide such a socially stable
reference53. In this vein, some authors have argued that drawing a legal
theory of competitive harm without having a clear role for competition in the
50These are the conceptions of the Yale Law School. See the seminal article Calabresi-
Melamed (1972).
51A. Phelp reviews the legitimate objectives which are pursued by competition law in
the book edited by Ehlermann-Laudati (2003). See also the other contributions of the
same volume.
52According to J. Buchanan (1976) \ \Social order" requires general acceptance of a
minimal set of moral standards. Well dened laws of property and freedom of market
exchange minimize the necessary scope and extension of such standards, but they by no
means eliminate them".
53In explicitly criticizing Posner, Buchanan (1974) distinguishes between \law...(which)
is a stabilizing institution providing the necessary framework within which individuals can
plan their own aairs predictably and with minimal external interferences...... (and)
legislation (which) is partially dierent in that its very purpose must be one of serving
or implementing explicit social or collective objectives". G. Monti (...), in discussing
Article 82 EC Treaty, notes Posner's position, in Posner (2000) ch. 9, with respect to
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, that not only monopolization should be forbidden, but all
practices leading to a distortion of competition, independently of the position of the rm
on the market. Such an approach is perfectly attuned to the economic paradigm, and
seems to have inspired the paper drafted by economic consultants to the EC Commission
(EACP, 2005), suggesting that application of Article 82 should take place independently
from the nding of a dominant position. However, as Monti notes, this would amount to
eliminate the prescription of Article 82 altogether, substituting with a provision forbidding
anticompetitive unilateral behaviour. This would be undesirable. In fact, it would have
two eects: it would eliminate the special status of dominant rms; but it would extend
an obligation of non-anticompetitive behaviour to all rms. The end result would be a
much less stable and foreseeable legal context for all rms.
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legal system risks opening up the way to policy perspectives which would be
incompatible with an economy led by free market initiative54. If the objective
of the law is to maximise consumer welfare or total wealth, it is well possible
to devise ways other than a competitive market system to obtain them, and
in such case there would be no reason to prefer one to another55.
In fact, the issue whether eciency represents a socially accepted rule
appears to be central to the purely economic interpretation of the Chicago
approach. As a matter of fact, even many of those who share the economic
approach to antitrust have reservations in accepting total welfare as the ap-
plication criterion, in so far as they do not share the view that application of
the law should be neutral to transfers of wealth damaging the consumer56.
However, once competition is no longer the objective of the law, and distri-
butional considerations are brought within the eciency context, the issue
may arise which weight they should be given. This could even lead to a
\consumerist" tilt in the application of the law.
This approach is suggested by some streams of analysis which look at
consumer welfare as the objective of antitrust law, from a distributional
\consumeristic" point of view. In such a case, ecient practices may be
considered anti-competitive if they do not lead to the maximum transfer of
welfare to the consumer in the short run57. These \consumerist" considera-
tions could be relevant when examining the EC experience, to which we now
turn58.
54This position clearly has roots in the vision of Hayek (1978). See Mestmaker (2007);
Zywiky-Saunders (2006).
55It may be appropriate to recall that one of the high points in the elaboration of the
theory of the market as an institution was the debate on the working of a market system
under a socialist regime. Under the in
uence of traditional model of perfect competition
socialist economists looked at competition as an ecient way of optimizing the use of
resources. Hayek (1935; 1945) argued that the benet of competition comes from its
ability to organize sparse knowledge: therefore it was most desirable regime, aside its
eciency characteristics.
56See Salop (2005), who notes that a total welfare approach would consider in a positive
way increases in prots obtained by inecient competitors, at the expense of consumers.
See also Pittman (2007).
57This is for instance the \consumer choice" approach suggested by Lande (1982) and
Averitt-Lande (2007).
58Examples of this kind of approach may be found even in the US jurisprudence: for
instance in the Supreme Court Kodak judgement, despite a small market share in the sale
of copiers, Kodak was found to monopolize the aftermarket for spare parts of the copiers
it produced, by refusing to supply spare parts to non authorized repairers. The decision
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2 Competition law in the EU
The above review of the evolution of economic and legal thought about the in-
terpretation and the application of antitrust law may help examining the de-
velopments in EC competition law which have taken place in the last decades.
In fact, the European approach is grounded on the ordoliberal legal-economic
vision, which conceives competition law as a basic tenet of the legal order
of a free market economy. This approach puts at the centre of competition
law the protection of the competitive process, i.e. the interaction guided by
rivalry between the competitors in the market.
Original ordoliberal thinking was substantially in
uenced by structural-
ism, and antitrust rules were guided by the idea that the way the competitive
process developed would be aected mainly by the structure of the market.
This characteristic of the approach and the relevance of market integration in
the application of EC competition rules have given rise to an over-formalistic
application of the law. Starting in the 1990s, the developments in legal and
economic thinking we examined above have started making inroads in the EC
approach, and more economic-based criteria have been introduced, includ-
ing a full-
edged consumer-welfare analysis. Recently, the EC Commission
seems to have shifted to a purely economic approach. The consequences of
this shift on the role European competition law are however still open to
debate.
2.1 The ordoliberal view of competition
It is generally recognized that at the basis of the antitrust provisions in the
Treaty is the vision about their role in ensuring a free market economy in a
free society, characteristic of the ordoliberal tradition This was at the time of
the drafting of the Rome Treaty the driving intellectual force in Germany, the
strongest continental European economy and the only one where a modern
competition law was in force59.
Ordoliberal competition vision shares many characteristics with the clas-
sical liberal view of competition. The competitive market system is placed at
was interpreted as justied by the desire to prevent that purchasers of Kodak machines
locked up by the purchase were subject to excessive pricing by the producer [Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992)].
59Gerber (1998); Pace (2005); Vanberg (2004); Ahlborn-Padilla (2007). A collection of
writings of ordoliberal legal and economic experts is in Peacock-Willgerodt (1989).
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the centre of a free political order: in a state of free competition all economic
players meet as equals under a legal viewpoint, and voluntary exchanges and
contracts are the only means by which economic activity are coordinated.
From this point of view a free competitive market has not only an economic
but also a social value. What is distinctive of the ordoliberal view is the role
of the legal order in ensuring a competitive market. The free market is not
one without rules, but is rather characterised by a legal institutional frame-
work in which market transactions take place60. This institutional framework
requires a (explicit or implicit) constitutional choice, implying that the legal
order must be conformed in such a way as to guarantee the development of a
free market. Core to such legal order is a competition law system governing
the use of private economic power, so as to guarantee that the freedom of
contract, which is obviously central to a competitive market economy, is not
used for the purpose of restricting or eliminating the freedom of contracting
of other parties.
At the basis of the ordoliberal view of competition law was the protection
of the competitive process though the prohibition of any form of conduct,
which restrained autonomous economic behaviour. Therefore, antitrust pro-
hibitions would apply not only to cartels (which are obviously incompatible
with a competitive order) but also to other types of agreements likely to have
the eect of restraining competition. As for unilateral conducts, ordoliberals
thought the law should forbid practices through which a rm used its mar-
ket power in order to prevent competition from other rms, or coerced the
freedom of choice of consumers.
In particular ordoliberals argued that a situation where a company dom-
inated the market was incompatible with a competitive order, unless the
company competed on the merits, i.e. by superior performance. In the view
of the ordoliberals this meant that the dominant company should not use
practices which would signicantly aect the competitive opportunities of
rivals and which were based on their market power61.
60As it may be clear from the preceding discussion, this view is also shared by other
liberal writers, like J. Buchanan and F. Hayek.
61Kallaugher and Sher (2004) recall Prof. Ullman proposal for identifying abusive con-
duct: a) the conduct must aect the competition opportunities of rivals; b) the conduct
must not be performance based. For instance this meant that delity rebates based on the
market share of the enterprise would not be allowed: but other kinds of rebates, available
to non dominant enterprises would be allowed. According to them this proposal was at
the base of the Homan La Roche ECJ decision (see below).
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From this approach it came that dominant companies should perform
\as if" they were in competition62: the prescription followed that dominant
companies should not indulge in practices to the consumers unavailable to
rms in competition: in particular excessive prices and discrimination.
Finally, these predicaments were applied to an economic vision, which
gave an important role to the structure of the industry, considered the main
factor of a competitive behaviour, and which was little optimistic that a
competitive order would be established spontaneously on the market. In
particular, in
uenced by the experience of the German economy between
the two wars, ordoliberals thought that oligopolistic industries would soon
evolve into cartels, leading to collective monopoly. From this point of view
the \as if" paradigm was also aimed at discouraging collusion: because rms
knew that they would not be able to exploit their market power on the con-
sumer, they would have little incentive to collude63. Therefore, the ordolib-
eral scheme was characterized by a certain favour for smaller competitors, as
they allowed the market structure to remain competitive.
2.2 Ordoliberalism and the shape of EC competition law
Reference to the ordoliberal vision of competition in
uenced the way in which
EC competition law was drafted, and in which it has been applied for decades.
First, a competitive regime was thought to be instrumental with respect
to the basic objectives of the Community as represented in Article 2 of the
Rome Treaty, i.e. economic integration and a common market. Therefore
a system ensuring that competition in the market is not distorted was in-
cluded since the beginning in Article 3.1 among the Principles of the EC
Treaty as actions necessary to achieve these objectives. As we shall see later,
this inclusion gave substantial strength to the application of the competition
provisions in the Treaty.
Second, as for the substantial provisions, in its rst paragraph Article 81
(originally Article 85) of the Treaty forbids agreements that restrict compe-
tition, incorporating the ordoliberal aversion on cartels64. From this point of
view a general prohibition of agreement which have as an \object or as eect"
62Gerber (1998); Ahlborn-Padilla (2007)
63See Ahlborn-Padilla (2007) quoting Eucken, a leading ordoliberal. See also Vanberg
(2004), who notes that ordoliberals thought that once a competition law was in place,
there would be no need for its frequent use.
64On the debate leading to the adopted version of Art. 81, see Pace (2005).
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the restriction of competition is followed by a list of types of behaviour which
are considered restrictive. Article 81 is however structured in such a way that
according to its paragraph 3 agreements which restrict competition may be
exempted from the prohibition and give rise to substantial improvements in
production and distribution, in technical progress (basically eciency eects)
which are passed on to the consumers. However, in line with the ordoliberal
vision, they cannot lead to elimination of competition from the market.
Article 82 (the original Article 86) forbids practices by a dominant com-
pany which restrict competition. Even in this case a number of practices are
listed which exemplify a forbidden behaviour. The list is substantially iden-
tical to the one in Article 81 and this shows how the drafters of the provision
were in
uenced by the \as if" paradigm. In fact, the list in Article 82 seems
to concern mostly exploitative abuses, i.e. practices, which directly aect
consumers. This is in sharp contrast with the provision in the US antitrust
law, which does not provide for exploitative abuses.
Therefore EC antitrust law resents the ordoliberal inspiration in many
ways. First, it is enshrined as a constitutional rule in the Treaty, and actu-
ally it is included in its basic Principles. Secondly, the competitive process
is the reference point of the antitrust law, as Article 81(3) allows agreements
enhancing eciency and consumers welfare as long as they do not lead to
elimination of competition from the market, while dominant companies are
prevented from abusing of their position in order to restrain competition.
Thirdly, an \as if" principle is stated in the provision concerning unilateral
practices. Finally, while the approach is centred on the protection of a com-
petitive process, and therefore on rivalry, Article 81 and 82 make explicit
reference to the expected eects of competition on the consumers: the condi-
tions for exempting restrictions set in Article 81(3) specify that the exempted
agreement must in any case lead to transfer of benets to the consumers. Ar-
ticle 82 species that abusive practices be forbidden in so far as they lead to
restriction of competition to the detriment of the consumer.
These principles still seem to contribute to the interpretation of the EC
competition law. In a recent and very debated case concerning the applica-
tion of Article 82 to a rebate scheme, the Advocate General argued in its
conclusion that \Article 82 EC, like other competition rules of the Treaty, is
not designed only or primarily to protect the immediate interests of individ-
ual competitors or consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and
thus competition as such (as an institution), which has already been weak-
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ened by the presence of a dominant undertaking on the market. In this way
consumers are also indirectly protected. Because where competition as such
is damaged, disadvantages to consumers are also to be feared".65 There is a
denite ordoliberal in
uence in this statement, in the reference both to com-
petition as an institution, and to the structure of the market. Furthermore,
consumers' interests are viewed as indirectly protected by the protection of
competition, and not as the direct objectives of this protection.
2.3 Early application of EC competition rules
Application of articles 81 and 82 by the Commission and the European Courts
has been for a long time guided with attention to the formal characteristics of
the practices they concerned rather than to the actual eects on the markets.
As for agreements, this formalistic attitude was reinforced by the enact-
ment, in 1962, of Council Regulation No. 17, which established the criteria
for application of competition rules. In fact Regulation No. 17 introduced a
notication system, whereby Article 81(3) exemptions could be applied only
to agreements which had been notied to the EC Commission or which con-
formed to the criteria set in general exemption regulation (block exemptions)
issued by the same Commission.
The Commission interpreted the prohibition in Article 81(1) very nar-
rowly, and issued block exemption regulations detailing very closely the
clauses of the agreements, distinguishing between clauses which were pro-
hibited in any case (black list) and those which were allowed (white list).
Therefore agreements tended to be structured closely following the allowed
clauses.
In the case of \vertical" restraints, the formalistic attitude of the Commis-
sion was reinforced by the presumption that agreements between producers
and distributors limiting the autonomy of the latter could lead to articial
segmentation of the European market. Therefore, in the early European
experience (and until recently) Article 81(1) was applied very restrictively
to vertical restraints and a great relevance was given to provisions in the
agreements which could limit the distributors' ability to sell to consumers in
dierent geographical markets.
In the area of unilateral behaviour, we have noted that Article 82 seems
65Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in (C-95/04), British Airways vs. Commission
of the European Communities, delivered 23 February 2006, par. 86.
27A. Pera / WP n.13 DiSSE, University of Macerata
to be concerned with the exploitation of the consumers. In fact, there has
been a limited application of Article 82 to exploitative abuses. 66
However in some fundamental decisions the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) interpreted the prohibition as aimed at practices which harmed com-
petitors, and established the limits to the behaviour of a dominant company,
in order to protect the competitive process. In Continental Can, a case in
which the Commission tried to prevent the acquisition by an American com-
pany producing metal containers of a competitor in the same sector, the ECJ,
while voiding the Commission decision, stated that the objective of EC com-
petition law is to protect the competitive process; therefore conducts which
weaken the competitive structure of the markets so as to impose damage to
the consumers are prohibited67. A relevant point is that in order to include
acquisitions under the prohibition of Article 82, the Court made reference to
the role of competition in the achievement of EC basic objectives, expressly
referring to Article 3(1)g and Article 2. The Court recurred to this teleolog-
ical interpretation in other instances, when it had to argue that some limits
to individual rights should be introduced in order to make them compati-
ble with the role of competition in the Treaty: in particular, it used this
approach in its rst essential facility case, ICI-Commercial Solvents68.
An aspect of particular interest of the Court's approach to unilateral
behaviour has been the characterization of an abuse of dominance as an
objective concept: insofar as the behaviour is liable to restrict competition
the same is abusive, irrespective of the intent of the rm. This conclusion
derives from the already noted approach that a dominant company must
compete only on the merits, and therefore it has a \special responsibility"
to perform \as if" it were in competition and therefore should not restrict
competition69.
This approach has led to a stream of decisions which tend to limit the be-
haviour of dominant suppliers to competition on performance. This has led
66In particular, there has been a number of instances where the Commission has applied
Article 82 to cases in which dominant rms were thought to apply excessive prices. For
a list and a discussion see Motta-de Stael (2003). While the ECJ has recognized the
applicability of Article 82 in these cases, it has generally found unsatisfactory the criteria
according to which the price was considered excessive.
67See Europemballage Co. and Continental Can Co v. Commission C-6/72 (1973).
68See Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v Commission C-
6&7/73 (1974).
69See case C-85/72, Homan Laroche & Co. AG vs. Commission (1979), par. 91.
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to the prohibition of practices which, when adopted by dominant suppliers,
could have as eect the exclusion of competitors from the market. Among
these are, in particular, exclusive agreements which are deemed to foreclose
the market to competitors70; discounts which are designed to exclude com-
petition71; refusals to deal with the competitors in the provision of input
necessary for operating on the market72.
These decisions have been criticized for not being based on economic anal-
ysis. Basically, the criticisms concerned two aspects. First it seemed that the
Commission and the Courts evaluated conducts on the basis of their formal
characteristics, and not on the basis of the actual or potential exclusionary
eects that they could be expected to have in the specic context. Secondly,
the analysis did not examine whether the exclusion leads to undesirable re-
striction of competition, or rather was justied on eciency grounds. As a
result the application of the law in the eld of unilateral practices tended
to concern practices, which were in fact benecial to the consumer and at
the sole eect to lead to the protection of inecient competitors rather than
competition. 73
70For instance Homan Laroche & Co. AG vs. Commission, above ; United Brands
Company C- 335/76 (1976); Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v. Commission. T
65/98 (2004)
71For instance Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v. Commission C 322/81
(1983) (Michelin I); British Airways v Commission of the European Communities quoted
above; and Michelin v Commission of the European Communities, CaseT-203/01 (2004)
(Michelin II).
72For instance ICI- Commercial Solvents quoted above; IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG
and NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG., Case C-418/01.
73For instance, in the case of ICI, the company, which was the only producer of aminobu-
tanol, which it used to produce solvents, decided to enter in the market for ethambutol, a
pharmaceutical product for which aminobutanol was an input. Therefore it terminated its
supply agreement with Zoja. The Commission and the Court made an early application
of the essential facility doctrine, and sanctioned the behaviour as refusal to deal. However
ICI was substituting for Zoja, and there was no change in the competitive situation from
the point of view of the consumer. In United Brands, the company tried to terminate
and then boycott a distributor which had undertaken to distribute bananas also from a
competitor. It is doubtful that the termination would have lead to a reduction of supply to
the consumer: actually two dierent distributors of dierent brands would have competed
more eectively. See Fox (1981).
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2.4 Towards a greater role for economic analysis
During the 1990s substantial changes have taken place in the application of
EC competition law, towards a greater reliance of economic analysis. In turn,
these changes were the result of several factors.
a) Factors of change
First, after fteen years of discussions, in late 1989 Council Regulation
4069/89 introduced a mandatory control for mergers of Community dimen-
sions in the EC. The introduction took place according to Article 308 of
the Treaty (at the time Article 235) according to which the Council may
introduce new legislation, which is essential for pursuing the objectives of
the European Community. Recourse to this Article was therefore based on
the fundamental role that competition law was considered to have on the
achievement of the basic Community aims on the basis of Article 3(1) and
Article 2 of the Treaty.
The introduction of merger control had important consequences on com-
petition law at large because merger analysis is perspective and concerns the
expected eects of the merger on competition in the market. Therefore it
is mainly based on the analysis of the economic structure and conditions
in the market, at a time in which attention to eciencies had already been
put at the centre of antitrust economic analysis. This in turn in
uenced the
formalistic attitude in the analysis under Article 81 and 82 as well.
Secondly, in the 1980s and early 1990s in a number of decisions concerning
vertical restraints, the ECJ stated the need for evaluating prohibition under
Article 81(1) in their economic and legal context74. The issue raised by the
ECJ was that, with the exception of hard-core restrictions concerning price
xing or market sharing, vertical and cooperative agreements could not in
principle be considered as restrictive by object. They could well pursue a
legitimate interest, and therefore would not need to be prohibited (and thus
did not need an exemption under Article 81(3)). This analysis was later
extended to horizontal cooperation agreements75.
It may be relevant to clear that in these judgments the ECJ was not
arguing for an application of Article 81(1) on the basis of the \rule of reason":
74L. C. Nungesser Kg E Kurt Eisele v. Commission of the European Communities,
Case 258/78, (1982) ; Pronuptia de Paris v. Schillgallis, Case 161/84, (1986);De Limitis
v. Henninger Br au, Case C-234/89, (1991).
75Court of First Instance in Case T-374/94, European Night Services v. Commission,
(1998).
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according to the Court, as later specied in Metropole,76 the balancing of pro
and anti-competitive eects of agreements should take place within Article
81(3). Rather, the ECJ was arguing that with the exception of hard-core
restrictions, agreements cannot be presumed to be restrictive and suggested
that attention should be given to the economic context in which practices
took place.
Third, at the turn of the 1980s competition legislation was introduced in
a number of countries (Ireland, Italy), or was modied in those which already
had one (France, Spain). Usually these new laws were structured according
to the provision of Article 81 and 82 of the EC Competition Law. However,
the way they were applied was often less legalistic and more in
uenced by
modern antitrust doctrine, giving more weight to the role of eciency in the
explanation of practices, and requiring analysis of their eects on consumer
welfare. This gave more strength to the opinion of those who thought the
application of EC Competition Law would move toward an economic-based
approach, oriented by the developments in legal and economic analysis we
have examined before77.
Finally, also as a result of the above, the Commission decided to move
its attention from vertical to horizontal restraints, and in particular to cartel
enforcement, channelling its resources toward this task.
b) Article 81 and vertical restraints
The treatment of agreements was the area which was rst aected by
change. In particular, a rst step was to question the way in which Article
81 was applied to vertical restraints. In the US, already in the 1970s the
Sylvania doctrine had excluded a per se prohibition of exclusive agreements.
The decisions of the ECJ, which we have referred to above, followed the same
inspiration78. Therefore, it seemed appropriate to revise the EC approach as
well. In the then existing framework of Reg. 17/62 the intent was reached
through the enactment of a block exemption for vertical agreements which
exempted agreements undertaken by concerns which had less than 30% of
the market, and in the issuance of detailed guidelines which were based on a
thorough economic analysis of the eects of the agreements79.
76See M etropole Television SA and Others vs Commission C 75/84 (1996).
77mong the early critics see Korah (1990); Pera-Todino (1996); Siragusa (1997).
78While these decisions did not argue for the application of the rule of reason, they
called for an economic analysis of practices. See Amato (1997).
79Regulation on the application of Art.81 par. 3 to certain categories of vertical agree-
ments and concerted practices, Reg 2790, 22.12, 1999 and the Guidelines on Vertical
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The regulation extended an exemption to vertical agreements whereby
the market share of the parties concerned were below 30%, unless they had
as their object retail price maintenance or exclusive territorial restrictions,
leaving however the possibility of a prohibition in case an agreement corre-
sponding to a lower market share had a restrictive eect. The Guidelines,
issued in 2000, went in detail to specify the criteria according to which the
eects of the agreements would be evaluated. It is relevant that in the guide-
lines the relevance of vertical restraints to the end of achieving eciency is
clearly recognized, and the direct and indirect eect on consumers of agree-
ments according to the criterion set in Article 81(3) becomes the standard
according to which to evaluate the degree of restriction.
The same line of thought led the Commission to formulate three set of
guidelines on horizontal cooperation (2000), according to which agreements
aimed at cooperation in research and development, specialization and trans-
fer of technologies would be automatically exempted under article 81(1), as
long as the market shares of the participating enterprises was suciently low,
and rms where independent in the phase of commercialization.80
Altogether, the new approach made less relevant the distinction between
Article 81(1) and 81(3) as even agreements which would fall under Article
81(1) would be automatically exempt if they would be covered by the provi-
sions of the guidelines.
c) Modernization
However, the introduction of an economic approach has had even more
far-reaching consequences: it put in question the same way in which Reg.
17/62 governed the application of Article 81, and in particular the Article
81(3) authorization system. Therefore, even before the vertical regulation
was enacted, the Commission issued a White Paper for the modernization
of the application of EC competition law81. After three years of public dis-
cussion, this led to the adoption of a new Council Regulation, Reg. 1/2003,
the Modernization Regulation, which completely overhauled the criteria set
in Reg. 17/62.
The Modernization Regulation had many aims, among which the increase
Restrictions O.J.E.C. C 291 of 13.10.2000.
80Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation
agreements, O.J.E.C. C 3 of 6/1/2001.
81White Paper on modernization of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the
EC Treaty, OJ C 132, 12.5.1999.
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in the investigative power of the Commission, the introduction of new powers
and types of decision and the possibility to open sector inquiries. Further-
more the regulation states the prevalence of EC competition provisions over
national competition law, so that EC competition law becomes the one and
only competition law for practices aecting the common market; and it dic-
tates the criteria for a decentralized application of EC competition law82.
However, to our goals, three aspects are really relevant. Firstly, the regu-
lation completely overhauled the previous system of application of Article 81
based on notications, introducing a \legal exception" system whereby agree-
ments are evaluated ex post on the bases of the whole of Article 81. The legal
exception system makes explicit that the criteria of application of the \rule
of reason" based on economic analysis become the rule for the application
of article 81. This may not appear particularly new: we have noted that in
Metropole the ECJ, while arguing that Article 81(1) was not concerned with
the rule of reason but with the inherent characteristics of the restrictions,
remarked that the rule of reason analysis should be performed through the
application of Article 81(3). However, at the time a widespread application
of the rule of reason was prevented by the fact that exemptions could be
obtained only through a notication to the Commission. Now, instead, this
criterion becomes the rule for the Commission, the national authorities and
the national judges.
This wider recourse to the rule of reason obviously gives great importance
to the system of legal and economic presumptions concerning the practices
under examination. As for legal presumptions, Regulation 1/2003, following
previous EC jurisprudence, species that the burden of proof of proving
restrictions under Article 81(1) is on the plainti, be it the Commission, a
national authority of a private party in front of a judge, while the burden
of proof of the exception under Article 81(3) is on the defendant. Economic
presumptions follow from economic analysis, which may provide an ex-ante
evaluation of the expected eect of the conducts on competition, and may
provide the economic criteria according to which the presumptions may be
veried.
These legal and economic criteria have been further explained by the
Commission, in its 2004 notice on the application of Article 81(3), which
gives ample consideration to the possibility that arrangements and practices
82See among the others Gerber-Cassinis (2006).
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may result in positive eects on consumer welfare83.
That consumer welfare has become the standard for evaluating the com-
petitive harm is shown by the recent decision of the Court of First Instance
(CFI) in the case Glaxo-Smith Kline84. The case concerned an imposition by
GSK to its distributors in Spain not to re-export its drugs, which were sold
at an administered price set at a much lower level than in other European
countries. The Commission had argued that GSK unilateral imposition was
equivalent to an agreement. And pretended that the export ban hampered
competition. The CFI, while refusing the rst argument, argued that there
was in fact no restriction of competition in the new markets, because the
practice did not reduce consumer welfare: in fact, because drug prices in all
the EU countries are administered by law, parallel exports did not lead to
any improvement in consumer welfare and rather corresponded to a mere
transfer of prots from producers to parallel exporters.
f) Work in progress: Article 82
In the eld of Article 82, concerning the abuses of dominance, the role of
economic analysis appears to have evolved more slowly. A stream of economic
analysis according to which the structure of the market was particularly
relevant has for a long time guided the Commission and the Courts.
In particular, this approach is re
ected in the treatment given to practices
such refusal to deal and rebates by dominant companies. Since ICI, the
Commission has sanctioned refusals to deal by a dominant company, and
has elaborated a wide-ranging doctrine of access to essential facilities, which
requires a dominant company to guarantee access to an input it controls every
time that such an access is necessary to eectively compete in the market
and the input cannot be reproduced economically. Such a provision extends
to IP rights when the aim of IP rights is necessary to oer a new product.
Despite this doctrine has been given economically reasonable interpreta-
tion, guided by economic considerations in Oscar Bronner85, it appears that
in other cases, ranging from ICI to the recent IMS Health86, the Commission
and the Court had been mainly guided by the preoccupation to maintain
access to the market, even when this was not clearly justied by economic
83Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, O.J.E.C. C 101 of
17.4.2004.
84Glaxo Smith Kline Services v. Commission T 168/01 (2006).
85See Bronner/Mediaprint, Case C-7/97, (1998).
86See IMS Health above).
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considerations.
Over time, a drive towards a more economically based antitrust analysis
emerged also in the context of Article 82 enforcement87.
However, a widespread perception exists that the enforcement of Article
82 EC continues to be driven by the consideration of structural aspects88.
This attitude may be traced also in cases involving rebates, a particularly
delicate subject, as it involves practices which are likely to benet consumers:
even so the Commission has applied a very formalistic analysis, considering
that rebates by a dominant company should only be based on cost eciencies
deriving from the level of sales, and they should therefore be proportional to
sales. Other kinds of discounts were usually considered restrictive. In partic-
ular, in Michelin II, in reviewing a Commission decision concerning rebates,
the ECJ evaluated that it was not necessary that discounts are proved to
have caused exclusion, and that it was enough to argue that they could have
the \likely" eects on competitors. Even more remarkably, in Michelin II
and in another case concerning rebates (BA-Virgin Atlantic), the Commis-
sion, and later the EC Courts, reached the conclusion that the practice was
restrictive despite the fact that the market shares of the dominant company
had declined (Michelin II) or had not increased. It is notable that in these
cases the issue of a pro-competitive justication for the rebates was submit-
ted to the CFI and the ECJ, which however preferred to stay to the settled
law89.
In 2005 the Commission presented a discussion paper on the application
of Article 82 to exclusionary practices, in which it tried to reconsider its
approach on the basis of a more sophisticated application of economic anal-
ysis90. The Commission aims at dening criteria of analysis of unilateral
practices based on their eects on competition, rather than on formalistic
classications. To this goal it has adopted a benchmark based on the de-
87For instance, a renement of economic analysis has taken place in predatory pricing
cases leading to Akzo, where the ECJ spelled out the criteria for holding predatory pricing
anti-competitive. [AKZO v. Commission of the European Communities, Case C-62/86,
(1991)] The CFI's ruling in Van den Bergh conveyed a message purporting that a substan-
tial degree of foreclosure must be shown to pursue an article 82 case. See Van den Berg
above.
88Hildebrand (2002); Gyselen (2003); Kaullager-Sher (2004).
89See cases Michelin II and British Airway above.
90EC Commission - DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82
of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005.
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nition of an \as ecient competitor" i.e. a hypothetical competitor, which
would have the same cost as the dominant company. Practices leading to
the exclusion of less ecient competitors, in fact, cannot be considered anti-
competitive because they derive from superior performance. Therefore, this
text gives substance to the criteria of \competition on the merits". Such an
approach is also an approximation to the test concerning the eects of a prac-
tice on consumer surplus. In fact, even if one argues that the restrictiveness
of a practice can only be evaluated by its eects on prices and quantities,
and therefore on consumer welfare, it is sometimes dicult to actually es-
timate what these eects will be. The analyses of the exclusionary eects
on the \as-ecient competitor" would then represent an approximation to a
test based on the eect on consumer welfare. On this basis, criteria deriving
from economic analysis are dened for each kind of practice (predatory pric-
ing, rebates, refusals to deal) which allow distributing the burden of proof
between the plainti (or the Commission) and the defendant.
In particular, the Commission goes at length discussing various kinds of
defences that it is willing to consider before dierent kinds of restrictive prac-
tices. In this context the Commission proposes to consider an \eciency de-
fence", whereby unilateral practices might be justied on eciency grounds,
as long as they conform to the criteria set in Article 81(3), i.e. they do not
lead to elimination of competition, and give rise to a transfer of benet to
the consumers.
The proposed guidelines represent a substantial move towards an eco-
nomic analysis of Article 82. Still, they represent a mix of structural and
eciency analysis91. In particular, the indication that a dominant position
could be dened at market shares as low as 25% (while in the ECJ jurispru-
dence such a threshold is generally set above 40%) seems inspired by the
structuralist analysis. Also, while the program of the proposed guidelines is
to oer a paradigm based on eects, in the actual proposals, economic analy-
sis is used to standardize a series of commercial behaviors that are presumed
to lead to exclusion of an ecient competitor.
91According to Ahlborn-Padilla (2007), the Commission Draft Guidelines represent a
rationalization of the traditional approach. G. Monti (2006) shares this view, however
noting the lower threshold for dominance could indicate the Commission has in fact shifted
to a Substantial Market Power approach, more restrictive than dominance.
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2.5 Ordoliberal tradition and reform
The previous analysis shows that the process of change in the application of
EC competition law was mostly directed at improving legal decision through
the application of economic analysis, along the lines suggested by the devel-
opments we discussed in Section I. In particular, the framework of assessment
used by the Commission relies on economic analysis of the eciency eects
of the practices on competitors as well as on the consumers.
However, one may wonder how much the introduction of economic anal-
ysis based on consumer welfare, or on more rened criteria of economic and
legal evaluation, is in fact compatible with a paradigm in which the basic
objective of competition law was the protection of the competitive process
based on rivalry, according to the traditional ordoliberal interpretation. All
the more so because, as we shall see, in various occasion the Commission
has argued that the aim of competition policy is \to protect competition in
the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and ensure an ecient
allocation of resources", therefore endorsing an eciency-based approach to
competition law.
From this point of view, however, it is probably appropriate to distinguish
between the ordoliberal legal vision and the ordoliberal economic analysis.
Only the rst one seems essential to the ordoliberal paradigm, and consists
of the constitutional role of competition law in the legal order, and therefore
of the role of the process of competition as a distinct objective of the law.
However, it is far from clear that such a legal vision must be necessarily
connected to the economic analysis which characterized the early ordoliberal
thinkers and which was the consequence of both the historical experience of
Germany in the 1920s and 1930s and of the inspiration by the structuralist
paradigm.
In particular, the development of the criteria for the application of EC
competition law took place at a time in which structuralism was the domi-
nant paradigm of analysis. As we have discussed, this paradigm suggested
wide use of per se prohibitions of agreements aiming at limiting autonomous
behaviour. In the US, the Schwinn doctrine about vertical agreements pre-
vented exclusive distribution. Cooperative agreements were seen as potential
instruments of collusion. And the maintenance of a certain structure of the
market was seen as the guiding principle for evaluating unilateral conduct.
This framework of analysis was dominant until the early 1970s. In this
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context, the approach to vertical agreements in the EC can certainly be con-
sidered overzealous, but the application of the EC law may be considered not
incompatible with the then prevailing schemes of economic analysis.
If structuralism is disentangled from the ordoliberal paradigm, the issue
then becomes whether an approach based on the protection of the competitive
process is compatible with the application of modern economic analysis. We
have already argued at the end of Section I that an analysis based on the
eects of the practices could well be compatible with such an approach,
provided that eciency eects are not considered to justify elimination of
competition, or its reduction unrelated to the benets to the consumers.
One can further note that it is not the attention to the competitive process
which led to the excessive formalism in the application of Article 81. As we
have argued earlier, this appears in fact to depend on the way in which the
Commission tended to interpret Article 81. This in turn depended on its
preoccupation with the objective of market integration, and the risk that
vertical agreements could lead to geographical segmentation.
A clear indication comes from comparing the practice of the Commission
with the decisional practice of the ECJ in the eld of agreements. Already in
1966, in Technique Mini ere92, in examining a case of exclusive distribution,
the ECJ argued that once the practice does not have as an \object" the
restriction of competition, i.e. the xing of prices or the subdivision of the
market, the prohibition in Article 81(1) should be evaluated on the basis
of the legal and economic context in which the agreement took place. The
Court therefore opened the way to an economic interpretation of the law,
which could go beyond a formalistic prohibition.
The fact that such path was not followed depended on the prevalence at
the time of the preoccupation of market integration: in the Consten/Grundig
decision, the Commission considered as forbidden by objective a clause of
exclusive territorial restriction protecting Consten, which was the exclusive
distributor of Grundig in France, despite the parties had argued that the
clause aimed to protect its investment in the development of the business.
The Court accepted this position 93. This decision, together with the way in
which the Commission interpreted the two-step analysis in Article 81, opened
the way to the formalistic approach we have described above.
However, in the above-mentioned Article 81 decisions of the 1980s and
92See Soci et e La Technique Mini ere v Maschinenbau Ulm Gmbh C- 56/65 (1966).
93See Consten & Grundig vs. Commission C 64/556 (1964)
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1990s, the ECJ again stated that with the exception of hard-core restrictions,
agreements could not be presumed to be restrictive without an economic
analysis.
These assessments are important because they were reached by the ECJ
within the context of the traditional analytical scheme inspired by the or-
doliberal tradition. Therefore they implied that, even in that context, a
meaningful economic analysis should be carried out before concluding that
a restriction to the autonomy of the contracting parties would have \as an
objective or as an eect" a restriction of competition, or rather it was just
a way to achieve other legitimate objectives, like a better sharing of risks
or the creation of appropriate incentives, without any negative impact on
competition in the market.
In the eld of unilateral exclusionary practices the evidence is less clear-
cut. At various instances both the Commission and the EC Courts have
argued that, even within the traditional paradigm of competition on the
merits, the evaluation of the exclusionary eects of the practices should be
made on the basis of economic analysis, in order not to hamper practices
leading to increases in consumer welfare. However in practice even in this case
the evaluation has tended to qualify as restrictive certain practices without
further inquiry about their eects.
However, it is doubtful that this conclusion derives from the use of the
paradigm of competition on the merits, rather than from its actual appli-
cation. Performance competition is in fact a vague concept, which must
be lled with recourse to economic paradigm, which takes into account the
signicance and implications on the practice at hand, and in particular its
eects on the market. If the practice is the result of a superior performance
it may lead to the exclusion of a competitor, but also to an improvement of
the supply conditions and to a better treatment of the consumer. We have
seen that criteria can be devised to take into account the eects from the side
of the consumer, as well as from the point of view of the excluded enterprise.
However, most EC decisions in the eld of unilateral practices do not appear
to conform to these criteria. In fact, the EC approach,, has continued to be
guided by the idea that the working of the competitive process is related to
a certain structure of the market. And this seems at the moment the most
relevant problem with the treatment of unilateral practices.
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2.6 New Rethorics in EC Competition Law
In the previous pages we have argued that the traditional approach to EC
competition law is not incompatible with an increasing role of economic anal-
ysis. However, in recent years the Commission seems to have taken a dierent
orientation. The change seems to have taken place with the arrival of Com-
missioner Monti, who soon put the emphasis on the role of competition law
and policy in increasing consumer welfare.94 This orientation has soon be-
come the ocial position of the Commission: this is the approach followed
in the 2004 Commission notice on the application of Article 81/3, where it
is specied that the objective of antitrust law \is to protect competition on
the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an
ecient allocation of resources".95
In a number of speeches, the successor of Mr Monti, Commissioner Neelie
Kroes, and Director General Philip Lowe stated even more clearly that \com-
petition is not an objective itself, but is an instrument for achieving consumer
welfare and eciency."96
In a recent speech, Lowe explicitly underlined the dierence between the
old and the new approach.97 He made direct reference to the old ordoliberal
paradigm calling for protection of the competitive process, and argued that
the Commission has now decided to follow a dierent paradigm, based on
an economic interpretation of competition as an instrument for achieving
consumer welfare and eciency. It follows that practices will be examined
on the basis of their eects on these objectives. The new attitude of the
Commission has therefore be taken as a clear sign that, as a consequence of
more attention to economic analysis and eects of the practices, application
of EC competition law is now inspired by the same principles which appear
to inspire US antitrust98.
94In one of his last speeches as Commissioner \Competition for Consumer's Benet", at
the 2004 Competiton Day in Amsterdam, Mr Monti recalled that \I said in my hearing
before the European Parliament back in 1999(...)that I would give \central importance
to the consumer".
95See Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, above, par. 13.
96See speech of Neelie Kroes at the London Competition Day, September 2005; in the
same vein speech of Philip Lowe at the Cartel Conference held by the Bundeskartellamt
in Munich, march 2007, \Consumer Welfare and Eciency { New Guiding Principle for
Competition Law".
97See the speech quoted above.
98Heimler (2007).
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However, this new approach rises a number of issues. The rst one is how
eective the shift has been. While it is true that in some decisions the CFI
and the ECJ have recognized the role of consumer welfare as a criterion for
evaluating restrictiveness, as we have seen the ECJ in particular still seems
to refer to the competitive process as the objective of the law.
Second, while the Commission undoubtedly appears to be willing to base
its decisions on an approach grounded on economic analysis, the general con-
text in which this is taking place does not appear to be similar to the one in
which the diusion of the eciency-based approach has taken place in the
US. There the establishment of the eciency-based paradigm has taken place
in connection with a vision of competition guided by incentives, character-
ized by the preoccupation of what we have called \type 1" errors, i.e. that
enforcement of antitrust law may hamper ecient practices. In this context,
an eciency-based approach was seen as ensuring that the constraints to the
creative force of competition were minimal.
This approach seems hardly compatible with the current evolution in
Europe. Here there seems to be less condence about the ability of the in-
centives to lead to vigorous competition, and more condence in the ability of
antitrust law to achieve desirable results. And a vigorous application of an-
titrust is suggested in order to remove private obstacles to competition, which
are considered to still pervasive99. Such an application, in fact, is guided by
very activist intervention, at the basis of which it is possible to discover a
preoccupation with the market structure and the appropriate behaviour of
dominant rms. The dierences between the attitudes in the application of
US and European antitrust are therefore becoming wider100. In such context
it is not surprising that there are some ambiguities in the self-proclaimed
orientation of the Commission towards an eciency-based paradigm, as we
have seen with reference both to decision making, and to the way in which
guidelines for action (in particular for Article 82) are devised.
In fact, the call for a dierent approach to the application of competition
law could be interpreted as a rhetorical argument in order to underline the
serious commitment of the Commission to an approach to antitrust law based
on objective criteria. In turn, a number of factors may explain the need for
this..
99Venit (2007), Padilla-Ahlborn (2007).
100See the article by former Assistant Attornery General for Antitrust of the Clinton
Administration W. Kolasky (2008), raising doubts on the US approach.
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First, the initial emphasis by Commissioner Monti on the approach was
undoubtedly dictated by the need to nd a ground of convergence with the
US approach. In the late nineties and at the beginning of this decade con-
troversies have arisen between the Commission and the US Antitrust Au-
thorities concerning the treatment of eciencies in merger. In particular, in
two cases, Boeing/Mc Donnell Douglas101 and GE/Honeywell102, the US Au-
thorities argued that the analysis of the Commission was guided by a scant
attention to economic analysis and eciency eects of mergers, with the re-
sult of protecting competitors rather than competition. The Monti approach
was meant to show that the Commission approach is not dierent from the
one of the US Authorities and that the conclusions reached in particular in
the GE/Honeywell case depended only on dierent evaluations on the ground
of economic analysis.
A second relevant factor is the drive of the Commission towards a vigorous
application of competition law, in the framework of a wider competition pol-
icy directed to remove the obstacles to competition in the European Union.
Since the late-1980s the Commission is leading a drive towards liberalization
of previously regulated sectors and elimination of State-created barriers to
an integrated market in service sectors103. This attitude has been strength-
ened by the conclusion of the 2000 Lisbon Intergovernmental Conference,
xing ambitious goals for the European economic system (THE lI. In this
scenario, the reference to a paradigm of application based on objective, e-
ciency based, criteria represented a guarantee for the European enterprises
that such a rigorous approach would be applied on the basis of objective
criteria.
A third relevant factor concerns an evaluation of the political alliances,
which could help the Commission in its enforcement eorts. While compe-
tition has become a bi-partisan paradigm, Commissioner Monti appears to
have perceived that there wasn't much support for the liberalization poli-
cies of the Commission in a number of important countries. Therefore, he
thought that the political backing of consumers represented an important as-
set for the Commission: and accordingly he intensied eorts to create links
101Commission decision of 30 July 1997, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, Case No IV/m.877
(1997).
102Commission decision of 3 July 2001, General Electric/Honeywell, Case No.
COMP/M.2220. (2004).
103See Anderson-Heimler (2007)
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with consumers' associations and to show consumers the role that competi-
tion could play in fostering consumers' welfare (for example, by introducing
the Consumer Liaison Oce). In this sense, he could also prot from the
development in the policies for the protection of consumers undertaken by
the Community in the late 1990s.
Finally, the recourse to an eciency paradigm also appeared useful to
overcome the traditional dilemma that aicted the application of compe-
tition law in the previous decades: as we noted, competition law has been
seen not only as a tool aimed at maintaining competition in the market, but
also to eliminating obstacles to market integration. This explains the role of
vertical restraints in the EC experience. Also drawing on his previous expe-
rience as Commissioner for the Internal Market, Monti's approach was to see
these two objectives as just instruments to achieve the nal goals of consumer
welfare and eciency: \competition and market integration serve these ends
since the creation and preservation of an open single market promotes an
ecient allocation of resources throughout the community for the benet of
the consumer."104 In fact, in its exposition of the benets brought by the
application of competition law to the European consumers, Monti usually
referred to cases in which benets to consumers derived from interventions
against practices aimed at segmenting the common market105.
While the new approach may satisfy some of the strategic objectives
pursued by the Commission, and in particular by the Competition Com-
missioner and Directorate General, it raises the issue whether the call for a
competition policy in the interest of the consumers may not induce an appli-
cation of the law in which consumers interest substitute for competition and
a distributional \consumerist" element is introduced in the administration of
competition law. The Commission seems conscious of this problem. In the
speech we quoted earlier, Lowe argues that once we dene consumer welfare
as the objective of the law, a trade-o may appear with respect to practices
which may be the result or the consequence of ecient competitive behaviour
of rms.
Such a preoccupation seems justied by the presence in the EC com-
petition law, and in particular in Article 82, of a pro-consumer orientation
represented by the prohibition of excessive price by a company in dominant
104Guidelines on Vertical Restrictions 2000 quoted above, par. 7.
105See for instance his speech in Athens. \Competition Enforcement and the Interest of
Consumers: a Stable Link in Times of Change" February 2003.
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position. There are a number of reasons for the introduction of the exces-
sive pricing provision in the EC legislation. One is the displeasure of the
traditional ordoliberal approach with monopolistic power, and the ensuing
precept that dominant companies should behave \as if" they were in com-
petition, also with respect to consumers. Other reasons may be found in
the situation of the European economy at the time of the institution of the
European Community. At that time markets were fragmented by national
borders, and in a number of sectors they were dominated by large national
champions, while regulatory institutions were not well developed; therefore,
a provision against excessive pricing may well have been justied.
However, many of these reasons do not seem to hold any longer: the
European market is highly integrated; most previously monopolistic sectors
have been liberalized and regulatory institutions have been established in all
countries; in a number of innovative sectors high prices compared to costs
may reward previous investment in research, or may just be the reward for
the rst to reach the market; there seem to be good reasons to leave the
market be oriented by prot opportunities provided by high prices compared
by costs, when they are not the result of collusion.
In fact, the main reason against the use of an excessive price provi-
sion is that it goes straight against the rationale of antitrust law: protect-
ing the competitive process guided by rivalry and therefore by incentives.
It ends up transforming the Competition Authority in a regulator, sti
ing
competition.106 That is why such a provision should be used only when the
monopoly depends on legal exclusives, and in any case it represents a sec-
ond best solution with respect to elimination of the limits to competition.
A second reason, and the one on which the European Courts have found
most convincing, is the great diculty in evaluating when a price is actually
excessive. As we noted, there have been a few cases in which the Com-
mission pursued companies for practicing excessive prices. While the ECJ
has recognized the applicability of Article 82 in these cases, it has generally
found unsatisfactory the criteria according to which the price was considered
excessive107.
However, in recent times there seems to be a trend toward a wider appli-
106Motta - de Steel (2003).
107In particular, Emil Paulis, an in
uential ocer at the Commission has recently argued
that this is the main obstacle to the application of Art. 82 to exclusionary practices. See
Paulis (2007).
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cation of the excessive price provision. Pressure for its application is coming
from a number of national authorities, now empowered to apply Article 82108.
The Commission itself is thinking of widening the Guidelines on the appli-
cation of Article 82 to exclusionary abuses to include exploitative abuses, if
only to clarify the limits to its application. In this context, the issue of an
application of the law not guided by a consumerist orientation arises.
2.7 The role of competition law in the Community legal order
The change intervened in the approach to the nal objective of competition
law may be seen in the context of the recent debate about the role of compe-
tition in the reform of the EC Treaty, following the failed attempt to adopt
a Constitutional Treaty.
We have already mentioned that in the original Treaty of Rome compe-
tition stands in Article 3 as one of the actions guaranteeing the achievement
of the objective of the Communities as dened in Article 2. While com-
petition was not among the direct objectives of the Treaty, nevertheless it
was a necessary instrument. Furthermore, as we have noted, Article 3 puts
competition within the rst part of the Treaty, referring to the Principles.
This is why in a number of cases the EC Courts have made reference to the
position of competition in the Treaty for giving an extensive interpretation
of the competition rules in the Treaty (Article 81-86) with respect to the
economic agents and the member States.
We have already noted that the ECJ referred to the role of competition
in Article 3 in order to extend the interpretation of Article 82 to prohibition
of certain kinds of exclusionary abuses. Such a teleological interpretation has
been at times adopted in order to allow use of the law to eectively pursue
the objectives of competition. Another instance in which such interpretation
was used has been in considering anti-competitive behaviour of enterprises,
which appeared to be justied by national legislation. In such cases the ECJ
argued for an application of relevant competition rules on the basis of the
need to safeguard the application of competition law and of the principle of
loyal cooperation of the member States in the Commission, stated in Article
10 of the EC Treaty109. Finally, as we have seen in the case of the merger reg-
108See for instance the views of A.Fletcher, an OFT ocial, at the round table on exces-
sive prices held by the Global Competition review, in January 2008.
109The rst case was Inno v.Atab C 13/77 (1977), a more recent case, concerning the
application of sanctions was Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi v. Autorit a garante della
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ulation, the reference to competition in Article 3 also allowed the adoption of
normative instruments, which were thought to be necessary for guaranteeing
a competitive regime on the basis of Article 308.
The role has been even more important in the activity of the Commis-
sion with respect to measures regarding competition undertaken by member
States, and therefore in the context of its approach to competition policy,
which we do not discuss here.
In any case, from these examples it seems that while a competitive regime
does not appear among the nal objectives of the Treaty, competition law was
given a special role in the European construction, very much according to the
ordoliberal principles. This role has remained through the various changes
induced by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. It was enhanced during
the discussion leading to the Project of Constitutional Treaty approved by
the European Convention, delivered in July 2003 and abandoned four years
thereafter. Competition entered in fact twice in part 1 of the Project, which
included the objectives of the Union. First Article I.3 of the project, listing
the objectives of the Union, includes an internal market where the competi-
tion is free and not restricted. Therefore, a competitive regime is recognized
as a stated objective of the European political construction. Furthermore,
Article I.13 gives the Union exclusive competences in the eld of competition.
However, the Lisbon Intergovernmental Conference has disavowed the
central role of competition among the objectives of the Project, due to the
action of the French Delegation. As a result of the Conference, the single
text of the Project of Constitutional Treaty has been rearranged in two dif-
ferent Treaties, one concerning the objective and institutional structure of
the European Union (the Treaty of the European Union { TEU) and another
one specifying the instruments (the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union
{ TFU). The objectives of the Union are now in the TEU and article 3 of the
TEU does not include competition any more. However, Article 3 of the TFU
includes competition among the policies for which the Union is exclusively
competent.
While the provision of exclusive competence of the Commission in the eld
of competition may be considered as a positive point, there is little doubt that
the disappearance of competition from the Treaty of the European Union,
which is the fundamental charter of the Union, would have put in jeopardy
the legal context in which the application of competition law has taken place
Concorrenza e del Mercato C 198/01 (2003).
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in the last decades. Furthermore, it would have prevented the use of Article
308 for the adoption of legal instruments, which would have been considered
necessary to the attainment of the objectives of the Union. This situation
has been partially reversed by the decision adopting a Protocol according to
which \the Union can take measures in the context of the provision of the
Treaties and in particular of Article 308 of the TFU, taking into account
that the internal market dened in Article I.3 of the TEU includes a regime
were competition is not distorted." Dierent opinions have been raised with
respect to the eect of the change in the role of competition in the Treaties.
The ocial position is that not much has changed: competition was not
an objective of the Union before and it is not now. The legal context has
not changed. Because of the legal role of protocol, competition is in any
case in the European Treaty and the EC Court may continue applying the
teleological interpretation which has allowed a wider role for competition law
and policy in Europe110.
Other commentators think that the change risks having negative conse-
quences in the application of competition law in Europe. In particular, they
underline the role that the articles concerning principles have always had in
guiding the interpretative process of the Court of Justice. From this point of
view. the presence of competition in Article 3 of the EC Treaty induced the
Court to dene competition as \essential for the accomplishment of the task
entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the functioning of the in-
ternal market"111. There is some doubt that the Protocol may have the same
interpretative status of the text of the rst few articles of the preamble of
the Treaty. This consideration seems to be particularly important when the
application of competition law must be balanced against social objectives,
which are now listed in the key interpretative articles. 112
Finally, there are also some opinions that at the end the role of compe-
tition may end up being strengthened. Indeed, the protocol links expressly
the internal market with its competitive working, as it starts from the con-
sideration that an internal market must include a system guaranteeing free
competition. Furthermore, Article 308 has been redrafted in the new TFU
110See the position taken by Concurrences Kroes and the intervention of the Head of the
Commission Legal service at the Conference organized by Concurrences. See Concurrences
(2007).
111See Courage Ltd vs Crehan C 453/99 (2001).
112See Riley (2007).
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so that legislative innovation may only concern the objectives of the Union.
From this point of view, the fact that according to the Protocol Article 308
applies with respect to competition provisions would show that these provi-
sions are really essential to the working of the Union113.
3 Conclusions
The objective of this paper has been to illustrate developments in the ap-
plication of EC antitrust law in light of the debates concerning the role of
competition in the economy and developments of economic analysis of the
market. From this point of view, we argued that the establishment and the
application of EC competition law has been guided by a specic vision of
the role of competition law in the legal order which gave a central role to
the protection of the competition process. Over the years the application of
EC competition law has progressed toward an approach guided by a better
understanding of the way in which markets work, and by a wider recourse of
economic analysis. Finally, in recent times the Commission, seems to have
moved to a view of competition law incompatible with the ordoliberal vision:
a move that at the moment is not shared by the European Courts of Justice.
It is obviously too soon to assess the eect of the modications stemming
from the Lisbon Treaties on the application of EC competition law. However,
the debate we just reviewed shows how important is the role that competition
law has in the legal order of the EU. It is somewhat baing that the attempt
to include competition among the objectives of the Union, therefore denitely
codifying the ordoliberal constitutional vision of the role of competition, took
place at a time in which the Commission (not the Court) was suggesting the
abandonment of such an approach in favour of one based exclusively on
economics.
At the end of Section I we noted the criticism levied at the purely eco-
nomic approach to competition by those who think of competition as a regime
stemming from the formal and informal rules governing the market, and not
only as a way of guaranteeing the most ecient use of property rights. Their
main point was that once competition is seen just as an instrument for welfare
maximization there is the risk that it may be substituted by other means,
which are considered more ecient. From this point of view, it is not sur-
prising that the main argument advanced in the debate about the role of
113See the intervention of M. Waelbroeck in the Concurrences Conference (2007).
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competition in the European Union was that competition is an instrument
and not an objective for European policies: and therefore a competitive order
may well take second place with respect to other more fundamental aims114.
114See the intervention of L. Id^ ot at the Concurrences Conference (2007).
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